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SURFING THE WAVES: AN EXAMINATION OF
SCHOOL FUNDING LITIGATION FROM SERRANO V.
PRIEST TO COOK V. RAIMONDO AND THE
POSSIBLE TRANSITION TO THE FOURTH WAVE
Christine Rienstra Kiracofe *
Spencer Weiler **
INTRODUCTION
As every student of education law learns, there is no
mention of schools, students, teachers, education, or any
related language in the federal Constitution. 1 Were scholars,
unfamiliar with the American system of public education, to
read through the federal Constitution in an attempt to
understand how children are educated, they would be left
with the plausible misunderstanding that the United States
does not have a formal system of schools to educate its
children. The absence of any language related to education
in the federal Constitution, coupled with language of the
* Christine Rienstra Kiracofe is Professor and Director of the
PhD program in Higher Education at Purdue University in West
Lafayette, Indiana. She can be reached via email at ckiracofe@purdue.edu
** Spencer Weiler is an associate professor in the Educational
Leadership & Foundations Department at Brigham Young University.
He is also the 2021-2022 president of the National Education Finance
Academy and the editor-in-chief of the BYU Education & Law Journal.
1
KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN
PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 88 (9th ed. 2019).
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Tenth Amendment indicating that “powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people” 2 mean that education is first and foremost a state,
and not federal, issue.
The geographic and political diversity of the 50 states
has resulted in a veritable patchwork quilt of school systems
throughout the country operating under myriad curricula and
radically different educational standards and guidelines.
With states free to fund education as they please, and to the
desired level as guided by state constitutional language,
there are significant differences in how schools are funded
from state to state. Given this, it is unsurprising that the
lion’s share of school funding litigation has been adjudicated
in state courts. A search of the literature yields hundreds of
scholarly articles on state school funding litigation; fewer in
number are articles focusing on federal school funding
claims. To mark the important anniversary of the landmark
school finance case Serrano v. Priest, we examine the
small(er) but important role that federal claims have played
in school funding litigation. Part I of this article provides an
overview of the federal origins of school finance litigation.
Part II of the paper examines the recent return of litigants to
federal courts through an overview of five recent cases
touching upon school funding and related issues. Part III
provides analysis of these new federal cases and what may
be the next (federal) “wave” of school funding litigation.
Part IV concludes with implications for potential future
litigants.

PART I: FEDERAL ORIGINS OF SCHOOL FINANCE
LITIGATION
Those familiar with school funding litigation today
would rightly characterize it as being uniquely situated
2

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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within the purview of state courts. Of the hundreds of school
funding cases filed over the past decades since the Serrano
ruling, the vast majority have been filed in state, not federal,
courts. However, when petitioners first filed litigation
challenging the funding mechanisms employed by states to
provide money to schools, they filed these early challenges
in federal courts.
McInnis v. Shapiro3
In 1968, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois issued a ruling in a school funding
litigation case addressing four school districts in Cook
County, Illinois, in McInnis v. Shapiro. 4 In this class action
case, petitioners argued that the state’s funding mechanism
permitted “wide variations in the expenditures per student
from district to district, thereby providing some students
with a good education and depriving others, who have equal
or greater educational need” and these disparities violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Illinois’ overreliance on local
property taxes to fund public schools 6 led to significant
disparities in per pupil funding. 7
The McInnis court characterized the “underlying
rationale of the complaint” to be “that only a financing
system which apportions public funds according to the
educational needs of the students satisfies the Fourteenth
3

McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
Id.
5
Id. at 329. Petitioners in this case also alleged that a number
of state statutes were violated, however given the topic addressed in this
paper, we focus exclusively on the federal constitutional violations
alleged.
6
The phenomenon of relying heavily on local property tax to
fund public education continues today in Illinois and many other states.
7
Id. at 330. Per pupil expenditures varied “between $480 and
$1,000” at the time of litigation, meaning that some students received
more than double the funding spent on the education of other students in
the state.
4
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Amendment.” 8 Philosophically, the trial court appeared to
agree with petitioners’ argument, noting “without doubt, the
educational potential of each child should be cultivated to
the utmost.” 9 However, the court drew a clear line between
school funding philosophy and the law, clarifying that “the
allocation of public revenues is a basic policy decision more
appropriately handled by a legislature than a court.” 10
Finding that the state funding system was “neither arbitrary
nor . . . constitute[s] an invidious discrimination” the court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment had not been violated. 11
Petitioners were essentially instructed to take their concerns
to the legislature and the case was dismissed. 12
Burruss v. Wilkerson 13
One year following the court’s decision in McInnis
v. Shapiro, the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Virginia weighed in on a second, similar school funding
lawsuit in Burruss v. Wilkerson. 14 Petitioners’ arguments in
Burruss were nearly identical to those in McInnis, arguing
that Virginia’s system of funding public schools “[c]reates
and perpetuates substantial disparities in the educational
opportunities available in the different counties and cities of
the state,” denying petitioners “educational opportunities
substantially equal to those enjoyed by children attending
8

Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Petitioners challenging the Illinois funding mechanism for
public schools have repeatedly been told by both state and federal courts
that school funding issues are non-justiciable political questions. See
Kelly Summers, Jon Crawford & Christine Kiracofe, A Legal and
Statistical Analysis of Illinois School Funding in Light of Pending
Litigation in Chicago Urban League v. Illinois, 309 Ed. Law Rep. 595
(2014).
13
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969).
14
Id.
9
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public schools in many other districts of the State” in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 The Burruss
court, like its counterpart in McInnis, sympathized with
petitioners’ plight, stating “plaintiffs seek to obtain
allocations of State funds among the cities and counties so
that the pupils in each of them will enjoy the same
educational opportunities. This is certainly a worthy aim,
commendable beyond measure.” 16 Despite this conciliatory
language, the court dismissed petitioners’ suit, finding that
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred:
[C]ourts have neither the knowledge, nor
the means, nor the power to tailor the public
moneys to fit the varying needs of these
students throughout the State. We can only
see to it that the outlays on one group are
not invidiously greater or less than that of
another. No such arbitrariness is manifest
here. 17
Serrano v. Priest 18 (Serrano I)
The case that ushered in what has been widely coined
as the “first wave” of school funding litigation was Serrano
v. Priest, decided by the California Supreme Court in 1971.
While Serrano I is rightly classified as a state, and not
federal case, the text of the case reads almost exclusively as
a federal one. As Derek Black notes, the only reference to a
state constitutional right is in a single footnote in the case
stating “our analysis of plaintiffs’ federal equal protection

15

Id. at 573.
Id. at 574.
17
Id.
18
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I).
16
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contention is also applicable to their claim under these state
constitutional provisions.” 19
Serrano I was a class action lawsuit filed by students
and parents in school districts located in metro Los Angeles
County, California. Litigants outlined three causes of action:
first, petitioners argued that the California funding formula’s
heavy reliance on local property tax revenues to fund public
schools resulted in significant disparities in per-pupil
funding. 20 Second, petitioners asserted that the funding
disparities led to a significant difference in “the quality and
extent of availability of educational opportunities” available
to schoolchildren. 21 They further argued that educational
opportunities available to petitioners were “substantially
inferior to the educational opportunities made available to
children attending public schools in many other districts of
the State” in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution. 22
Petitioners’ third cause of action asserted that “an actual
controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties as
to the validity and constitutionality of the financing scheme
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and under the California Constitution.” 23
The state argued that “the applicability of the equal
protection clause to school financing has already been
resolved adversely to plaintiffs’ claims by the Supreme
Court[].” 24 However, the California Supreme Court rejected
this assertion, clarifying that while the U.S. Supreme Court
had issued per curiam affirmances in McInnis 25 and
19

DEREK BLACK, SCHOOL HOUSE BURNING:
PUBLIC
EDUCATION AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 202 (2020)
(citing Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1250).
20
Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1244.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1263.
25
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
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Burruss, 26 the content of the Court’s opinion had been
limited to a single statement: “the motion to affirm is
granted and the judgment is affirmed.” 27 Thus, the
California high court proceeded in its analysis of petitioners’
claims in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court acknowledged significant disparities in
per-pupil spending and assessed valuation between districts.
For example, the court highlighted expenditures and
assessed valuation for three different Los Angeles County
school districts for the years of 1968-69. Baldwin Park
school district spent $577 per-pupil, Pasadena Unified
school district spent $840 per-pupil, and Beverly Hills – the
highest spending district – spent $1,232 per-pupil. 28 Perpupil spending was closely linked with assessed valuation,
with Baldwin Park at just $3,706 per child, $13,706 per child
in Pasadena, and $50,885 per child in Beverly Hills, “a ratio
of 1 to 4 to 13.” 29 Deliberating on these data, the court
considered whether wealth should be considered a suspect
classification – something that would trigger the application
of strict scrutiny. The court found “irrefutable” the
proposition that “the school financing system classifies on
the basis of wealth.” 30 The court observed that property
wealthy districts like Beverly Hills, for example, could raise
significantly more money per-pupil with lower tax rates than
property-poor districts like Pasadena, and especially
Baldwin Park, noting that “affluent districts can have their
cake and eat it too: they can provide a high quality education
for their children while paying lower taxes. Poorer districts,
by contrast, have no cake at all.” 31
The court also addressed petitioners’ argument that
education is a fundamental interest, something that would
26

Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
Id. at 44.
28
Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1248.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1250.
31
Id. at 1251–52.
27
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likewise trigger the application of strict scrutiny. The
majority decision cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education to underscore the importance
of education:
Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local
governments … it is the foundation of good
citizenship … it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal
terms. 32
The court concluded that “the distinctive and priceless
function of education in our society warrants, indeed
compels, our treating it as a ‘fundamental interest’” 33 and
applied strict scrutiny to its analysis of petitioners’
complaints. Accordingly, the court found for the petitioners,
holding that the current funding mechanism in the state
violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Great Hope for School Funding Petitioners: San
Antonio v. Rodriguez 34
Petitioners’ landmark victory in Serrano I drew the
attention of similarly-situated litigants across the country.
Individuals in states other than California hoping for a
32

Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1256 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
33
Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1258.
34
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
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similar outcome for students in their jurisdiction were
presented with two different paths: 1.) petitioners could file
litigation similar to Serrano I in their state, hoping to secure
a similar outcome, or 2.) petitioners could file litigation in
federal court. By following the latter path, litigants hoped
that the U.S. Supreme Court would share the California High
Court’s interpretation of education as a fundamental right
and likewise address the constitutionality of significant
differential per-pupil spending and assessed valuation in
public school districts within a state.
Like Serrano I, Rodriguez was a class action lawsuit,
filed by children and parents living within the boundaries of
Edgewood Independent School District (EISD), a propertypoor district in San Antonio, Texas. EISD was compared to
the much wealthier neighboring Alamo Heights Independent
School District (AHISD) to highlight the role the district’s
tax base plays in determining per-pupil funding. 35 For
example, in 1967-68, EISD had an average assessed property
value of $5,960 per-pupil – a figure more than 8 times less
than the per-pupil assessed property value of $49,000 for
AHISD students. 36 The two districts also had significantly
different tax and per-pupil spending rates. EISD taxed
residents at a rate of $1.05 “per $100 of assessed property”
and was able to spend just $356 per pupil. 37 In comparison,
AHISD had a significantly lower tax rate of $0.85 and spent
$594 per pupil. 38 Thus, even though residents of EISD taxed
themselves at a significantly higher rate, the relatively low
tax base of their community meant that they could not come
close to meeting the per-pupil funding achieved by
neighboring AHISD at a far lower tax rate.
35
It is also important to note the significant demographic
differences between the two districts. The Court’s decision notes that
EISD students were more than 90% Hispanic and 6% Black. In
comparison, AHISD students were “predominantly Anglo” with a
minority student population of less than 20%. Id. at 13–14.
36
Id. at 12.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 13.
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The trial court, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas, held that discrepancies such as
those highlighted were violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court noted that:
Having determined that the current system
of financing public education in Texas
discriminates on the basis of wealth by
permitting citizens of affluent districts to
provide a higher quality education for their
children, while paying lower taxes, this
Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiffs have been denied equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution.39
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, appellants argued that
if Texas’ financing mechanism was subjected to strict
scrutiny, as the lower court had opined, that neither Texas’
nor “its counterpart in virtually every other State will not
pass muster.” 40 Thus, the first major point of order for the
Supreme Court was to determine whether or not strict
scrutiny should be applied.
As outlined above, petitioners argued for the
application of strict scrutiny for two reasons: 1.) that
education was a fundamental right, and 2.) that wealth was a
suspect classification. Thus, the Supreme Court considered
both of these arguments and ultimately held that it found
“neither the suspect-classification no[r] the fundamentalinterest analysis persuasive.” 41
The High Court was critical of the District court’s
analysis of wealth discrimination, the former noting that
39

Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280,
285 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
40
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
41
Id. at 18.
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“there is reason to believe that the poorest families are not
necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts,” citing
a Connecticut study in support of this assertion. 42 While the
Court acknowledged that “whether a similar pattern would
be discovered in Texas is not known,” that it ultimately did
not matter as there was “no basis on the record in this case
for assuming that the poorest people…are concentrated in
the poorest districts.” 43 The Court further clarified that
appellants’ claim that an unequal education was received
was constitutionally quite different from a total deprivation
of education altogether. The Court clarified “at least where
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.” 44
Thus, the Court did not agree with petitioners’ assertion that
wealth was a suspect class.
Like the court in Serrano I, the U.S. Supreme Court
also referenced Brown v. Board of Education, underscoring
the value of education to society and individuals. However,
in contrast, the Rodriguez Court held that though important,
education fell short of classification as a fundamental right.
The Court wrote:
Nothing this Court holds today in any way
detracts from our historic dedication to public
education. We are in complete agreement with
the conclusion of the three-judge panel below
that ‘the grave significance of education both to
the individual and to our society’ cannot be
doubted. But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for
purposes of examination under the Equal
Protection Clause. 45
42

Id. at 23.
Id.
44
Id. at 24.
45
Id. at 30.
43
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The Court clarified that “social importance is not the critical
determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict
scrutiny.” 46 Thus, with both petitioners’ arguments for the
application of strict scrutiny having failed, the Court found
for the state.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision would have a
profound and lasting impact on school funding litigation in
the United States. Most significantly, San Antonio v.
Rodriguez shut the proverbial door on petitioners’ hope for
addressing school funding inequities at the federal level.
Instead, what resulted over the next decades – and continues
today – are scores of cases filed in state courts. The shortterm impact of Rodriguez, however, was immediate and
swift, as the California Supreme Court decided Serrano v.
Priest (Serrano II) 47 in 1976.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II) 48
After the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Serrano I, the state legislature went to work, passing two
pieces of legislation addressing school funding and
significantly increasing the per-pupil foundation, or base,
funding level. For example, the per-pupil base went from
$355 per elementary student and $488 per high school
student to $765 and $950, respectively, in the 1973-1974
school year. 49 While the increase in per-pupil funding was
certainly a welcome turn of events for California
schoolchildren, it did not address the equal protection
concerns raised in Serrano I. The court noted that “it is clear
that substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil resulting

46

Id. at 32.
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano II).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 935.
47
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from differences in local taxable wealth will continue to
exist” under the new legislation. 50
Addressing the impact of Rodriguez on its previous
decision in Serrano I, the court explained:
We—along with the trial court and the
parties—think it is clear that Rodriguez
undercuts our decision in Serrano I to the
extent that we held the California public
school financing system (if proved to be
as alleged) to be invalid as in violation of
the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. However, as we
made clear in footnote 11, our decision in
Serrano I was based not only on the
provisions of the federal Constitution but
on the provisions of our own state
Constitution as well.51
With this statement, the California Supreme Court invoked
the one mention of a California constitutional violation in
Serrano II, and—in keeping with the impact of Rodriguez—
effectively acknowledged the return of school litigation in
California to the purview of the state.

PART II: RECENT FEDERAL SCHOOL FINANCE
LITIGATION
In the decades after Serrano II, school funding
litigation was almost exclusively conceptualized as a state
issue. However, in the recent half-decade, federal school
finance litigation has experienced somewhat of a resurgence.
Since 2017, there have been five school finance lawsuits
50
51

Id. at 938.
Id. at 949.
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filed in the federal court system. This recent shift from state
courts to federal could signal the long-anticipated fourth
wave in school finance litigation. 52 Each of the five cases are
summarized below. In our discussion of the five cases, we
review the plaintiffs’ claims, the justification for filing the
lawsuit in the federal court system, and the holding or
settlement agreement.
Ella T. v. State of California (2017) 53
The Ella T. complaint focused on the importance of literacy
and the fact that California’s system for funding public
education failed to provide specific groups of students access
to adequate literacy instruction.
The Claim
The plaintiffs in the Ella T. case were students
attending schools in Los Angeles Unified School District,
Stockton Unified School District, and a charter school in
Inglewood Unified School District. 54 Each of the plaintiffs
attended schools where academic performance is
significantly below the state average. 55 The defendants are
the state of California, the state board of education, the state
52

Christie Geter, Let’s Try This Again, Separate Educational
Facilities are Inherently Unequal: Why Minnesota Should Issue a
Desegregation Order and Define Adequacy in Cruz-Guzman v. State, 38
LAW & INEQ. 165, 174–175 (2020). See also Lauren Nicole Gillespie,
The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation: Pursuing a Federal
Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (2010).
53
Complaint, Ella T. v. State of California, No. BC685730
(Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017). A copy of the complaint can be found at
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/171205-ellla-t-v-californiacomplaint.pdf.
54
Id. at 2.
55
Id. at 3. Proficiency rates in the plaintiff schools are all under
11% of students attaining the pre-determined benchmark in reading and
math and “are frequently under 5%.”
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department of education, and specific individuals in their
official state capacities. 56
The complaint focuses on the lack of literacy
instruction provided to the plaintiffs and asks for “a judicial
declaration that the Defendants have violated the state
constitution and ‘statutory provisions.’” 57 The plaintiffs
contend:
[T]he State’s system of education is failing
them. An education that does not provide
access to literacy cannot be called an
education at all. Nor can it prepare students
to be citizens, participate meaningfully in
politics, exercise free and robust speech, and
voice the views of their communities. In
California’s education system, the children of
the “haves” receive access to a basic
education while the children of the “have
nots” are barred access, rendering the state
system of public education the great
unequalizer. 58
Specifically, the plaintiffs’ complaint contends the
defendants’ actions, or inactions, related to literacy
instruction violated California’s Equal Protection Clause in
the state constitution 59 and constituted an “illegal
expenditure of taxpayer funds.” 60
The Justification for Filing Federally

56

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 56.
58
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
59
Id. at 55. California’s Equal Protection Clause is found in
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a); id. art. IV, § 16(a).
60
Complaint at 56, Ella T., No. BC685730 (Super. Ct. Cal. Dec.
5, 2017).
57
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Despite the fact that it had been 44 years since the
adjudication of the Rodriguez case when this case was
filed, 61 there was very little justification provided in the Ella
T. complaint for filing in the federal courts. The first
justification is specific to the state board of education, which
is “required to supervise local school districts to ensure that
they comply with State and federal law requirements
concerning educational services.” 62 The second justification
argues that the state department of education has the duty to
cooperate “with federal and state agencies in prescribing
rules and regulations.” 63 In the third effort to justify filing
the complaint federally, the plaintiffs point out that
California schools receive federal funds as part of a school
improvement effort to raise academic performance. 64
Finally, the plaintiffs’ claim includes the following
statement, “Defendants’ expenditure of federal, state,
county, and/or municipal funds to administer and implement
a system of public education that engages in unconstitutional
discrimination, as challenged herein, is unlawful.” 65
The Ruling
The defendants filed motions to have the case
dismissed since the plaintiffs failed to identify a specific
class of students that is being negatively impacted by the
alleged discrimination. In addition, the defendants moved to
have the case dismissed due to the lack of connection
between the state’s actions or inactions and the plaintiffs’

(1973).
5, 2017).

61

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1

62

Complaint at 4, Ella T., No. BC685730 (Super. Ct. Cal. Dec.

63

Id.
Id. at 44.
65
Id. at 56.
64
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literacy issues. These motions were rejected in 2018, and the
judge allowed the case to proceed to trial. 66
Following the 2018 decision, the two sides agreed to
a settlement. The specifics of the settlement included the
agreement to “propose legislation during the 2020-2021
legislative session” aimed at addressing the literacy issue for
students in property-poor schools and school districts. 67 The
new state statute makes $50 million available annually to the
75 lowest performing elementary schools throughout the
state, in the form of block grants, to address literacy issues.
In addition, $3 million is available to school districts to
contract with literacy experts who can help with the
implementation of the literacy improvement plans. 68
Martinez v. Malloy (2018) 69
The Martinez case focuses on school funding issues
involving Connecticut students residing in inner city school
districts.
The Claim
The plaintiffs in the Martinez case are five “students
enrolled in low-performing traditional public schools in
Bridgeport and Hartford” Connecticut, as well as their
parents. 70 The plaintiff parents and students had repeatedly
attempted to transfer to high performing magnet schools or
charter schools in the area, but, due to state-imposed limits
66

SCHOOLFUNDING, https://www.schoolfunding.info/litigationmap/california/#1484003321789-d475191d-188c
(click
“Recent
Events) (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
67
ELLA
T.
SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT
1
(2020),
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/200220-literacy-ca-ella-tsettlement-agreement.pdf.
68
SCHOOLFUNDING, supra note 66.
69
Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F.Supp.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2018).
70
Id. at 82.

205
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2022

17

BYU Education & Law Journal, Vol. 2022, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 5

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2021

to these educational alternatives, these efforts were denied. 71
The defendants in this case are five individuals in their
political capacities. 72
The plaintiffs’ case alleges that the defendants are
perpetuating a funding formula for public education that
disproportionately favors affluent, White student
populations while denying historically marginalized
students, especially those living in inner cities, “a minimally
adequate education.” 73 In addition, petitioners argue the state
inexcusably promotes “educational inequity and
inadequacy” by placing a hold on inter-district magnet
schools and disincentivizing charter schools from entering
Connecticut. 74
The plaintiffs’ case focused on seven specific
complaints. First, “the defendants … violated the plaintiffs’
fundamental right to substantial equality of education
opportunities under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

71

The state of Connecticut imposed a moratorium on the
construction of new inter-district magnet schools in 2009 so that a statewide magnet school plan could be developed. At the time of the Martinez
ruling, the moratorium was still in place and a statewide plan had not
been developed. Related to charter schools, the plaintiffs presented data
showing that Connecticut inner-city charter schools were outperforming
the traditional public schools in the same area. However, the way the
state funds charter schools serves to disincentivize “charter school
operators from trying to open new charter schools in the state.” Id. at 80–
81.
72
Id. at 74. The specific individuals named in the lawsuit were:
Dannel P. Malloy as Governor of Connecticut; Dianna Wentzell as the
state commissioner of education; Kevin Lembo as the state comptroller;
Denise Nappier as state treasurer; and Denise W. Merrill as state
secretary of state.
73
Id. at 79–80.
74
“The plaintiffs allege that the State knows that ‘inter-district
magnet schools are a superior alternative to its traditional district schools
that are failing to provide thousands of children with a minimally
adequate education… The plaintiffs allege that Connecticut’s approach
to funding charter schools disincentivizes charter school operators from
trying to open new charter schools in the state.” Id. at 80–81.
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Protection Clause.” 75 Second, defendants’ actions also
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause by purposefully denying plaintiffs from accessing a
minimally adequate education. Third, the defendants
violated the Equal Protection Clause by requiring plaintiffs
to attend failing public schools and, at the same time,
restricting alternative education opportunities (inter-district
magnet schools and charter schools). Fourth, petitioners
argue the defendants’ actions that deny plaintiffs from
accessing a minimally adequate education also violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Fifth,
petitioners assert “the defendants have violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause on its face and
as applied to the plaintiffs, because they knowingly infringed
on the plaintiffs’ fundamental liberty and punish the studentplaintiffs for something beyond their control.” 76 Sixth, the
plaintiffs claim the defendants’ failure to fulfill its
constitutionally required duty regarding public education
violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the plaintiffs contend
that the defendants’ failures to properly fund public
education in the inner cities of Connecticut violates 42
U.S.C. § 1983 “by depriving the plaintiffs of numerous
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 77
The Justification for Filing Federally
The seven claims in the plaintiffs’ case are built
around the U. S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the plaintiffs cite previous
cases decided by the U. S. Supreme Court, including
Rodriguez and Plyler v. Doe. 78 Related to the Plyler holding,
75

Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
77
Id.
78
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
76
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the plaintiffs argue this ruling establishes a higher scrutiny
standard that applies to the Connecticut case because the
defendants have enacted statutes that create burdensome
obstacles to the plaintiffs receiving a minimally adequate
education.
The Ruling
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ seven claims, arguing that the plaintiffs “lack
standing, that the plaintiffs’ suit is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, and that the statutes at issue should be subject
to rational basis scrutiny.” 79 In addition, the defendants
argued that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim.
The Court granted the defendants’ motions on all the claims
except for the sixth. The only reason the Court did not deny
the motion on the sixth claim was because the “defendants
d[id] not provide any argument in their memorandum of
law.” 80
To determine the standing question, the Court
considered three factors: injury-in-fact, 81 causation, 82 and
redressability. 83 To establish injury-in-fact, plaintiffs are
required to document actual harm that negatively impacted
them. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ case clearly
documented injury and that the plaintiffs had standing in this
79

Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F.Supp.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 84.
81
Id. at 85. “To show an injury-in-fact, the plaintiffs must have
suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjecture or
hypothetical.’”
82
Id. at 87 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Donziner, 833 F.3d. 74,
121 (2d Cir. 2016)). “The traceability requirement for Article III
standing means that ‘the plaintiffs must demonstrate a causal nexus
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury.’”
83
Id. “To satisfy the redressability prong of Article III standing,
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they ‘personally would benefit in a
tangible way from the court’s intervention.’”
80
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regard. 84 Related to causation, the Court concluded that
“[b]eing in those failing schools is the direct cause of their
injury, and the laws at issue deprive them of the opportunity
to attend a school that is not failing.” 85 Finally, related to
redressability, the plaintiffs asked the Court to hold the
state’s anti-opportunity laws against magnet and charter
schools unconstitutional. The Court determined a ruling that
invalidated these anti-opportunity laws would increase the
likelihood of the plaintiffs receiving “an adequate and equal
education.” 86 In short, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs did
have standing.
The Court then analyzed the defendants’ motion to
dismiss because the lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. According to the ruling, “The Eleventh
Amendment precludes suit against the State and its officers
unless: (1) the State unequivocally consents to suit in federal
court; (2) Congress unequivocally abrogates the State’s
immunity; or (3) the case calls within the Ex parte Young
exception.” 87 Despite the claim from the defendants that Ex
parte Young does not apply “because relief in this case will
interfere with a recent state court judgment,” 88 the Court held
that there is a precedent for allowing challenges to the way
states fund public education to proceed in federal courts if
the plaintiffs satisfy the Ex parte Young standard and the
plaintiffs did satisfy this standard in the Martinez ruling.
Finally, the defendants argued the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim. This is where the Court’s ruling unequivocally
sides with the defendants. In each of the seven claims,
excluding the sixth (which the defendants “make no
argument with respect to Claim Six in their memorandum in
84

Id. at 85.
Id. at 87.
86
Id. at 88.
87
Id. The Ex parte Young ruling, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows
a lawsuit to proceed in federal courts, despite a state’s sovereign
immunity, when there is evidence that the state or its agents acted
contrary to the U. S. Constitution or federal statute.
88
Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F.Supp.3d 74, 90 (2d Cir. 2018).
85
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support of their motion to dismiss” 89), the Court held that the
plaintiffs failed to make a solid legal claim. This failure to
state a claim is the reason the plaintiffs lost this case.
Williams v. Reeves (2020) 90
Williams v. Reeves raises concerns over the funding
for public education in Mississippi.
The Claim
In Williams v. Reeves, the plaintiffs are lowsocioeconomic status mothers of children attending public
schools in Mississippi.91 The plaintiffs allege that the current
funding for public education in Mississippi is inadequate.
The defendants are the ones held responsible for the current
condition of funding in the state. The named defendants in
the lawsuit are thirteen individuals in their current political
positions.92
The plaintiffs in Williams v. Reeves invoke a
historical fact as the foundation of their claim. Specifically,
following the Civil War, Mississippi was only readmitted
into the Union once it met specific readmission conditions,
89

Id. at 94.
Williams v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 2020).
91
Id. at 732.
92
The named defendants are: Tate Reeves (state governor);
Philip Gunn (speaker of the state house of representatives); Tate Reeves
(state lieutenant governor); Delbert Hosemann (secretary of state); Carey
M. Wright (state superintendent of education); Rosemary Aultman (chair
of the state board of education); Jason Dean (member of the state board
of education); Buddy Bailey (member of the state board of education);
Kami Bumgarner (member of the state board of education); Karen Elam
(member of the state board of education); Johnny Franklin (member of
the state board of education); William Harold Jones (member of the state
board of education); John Kelly (member of the state board of
education); and Charles McClelland (member of the state board of
education).
90
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which included a prohibition on amending the state
constitution if the modifications deprived “any citizen or
class of citizens of the United States of the school rights and
privileges secured by the constitution of said State [emphasis
added].” 93 The plaintiffs allege that Mississippi’s current
education clause violates the conditions for readmission. The
current education clause reads, “[t]he Legislature shall, by
general law provide for the establishment, maintenance and
support of free public schools upon such conditions and
limitations as the Legislature may prescribe.” 94 In contrast,
the education clause adopted in 1868 read:
As the stability of the republican form of
government depends mainly upon the
intelligence and virtue of the people, it shall be
the duty of the Legislature to encourage, by all
suitable means, the promotion of intellectual,
scientific,
moral,
and
agricultural
improvement, by establishing a uniform system
of free public schools, by taxation or otherwise,
for all children between the ages of five and
twenty-one years, and shall, as soon as
practicable, establish schools of higher grade. 95
Since 1868, when the education clause was enacted as a
condition for Mississippi being readmitted to the Union, the
state has amended this portion of the state constitution four
times. 96 The plaintiffs allege that the current state education
clause clearly violates the conditions for readmission to the
Union because “school rights and privileges” have not been
protected since 1868. 97 Specifically, the plaintiffs point to
93

Id. (emphasis added). The quote is from the original statutory
language when Mississippi was readmitted to the Union.
94
MISS. CONST., art. VIII § 201 (1987).
95
MISS. CONST., art. VIII § 1 (1868).
96
Williams v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 733 (5th Cir. 2020).
97
Id.
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the fact that a key quality standard found in the education
clause was dropped. The key standard was “a uniform
system of free public schools,” which has been identified by
school finance scholars as an important quality standard. 98 In
contrast, the current iteration of the state’s education clause
makes no reference to the need for any degree of
uniformity. 99 And, this omission of uniform not only violates
the conditions for readmission, it also has resulted in
“significant disparities in the educational resources,
opportunities, and outcomes afforded to children in
Mississippi based on their race and the race of their
classmates.” 100
The plaintiffs cite data demonstrating that the
plaintiffs’ schools are struggling to perform academically. In
addition, they allege that the school facilities are dilapidated,
their children are regularly taught by underqualified and
inexperienced teachers, and that the state’s funding formula
restricts the plaintiff school districts from offering an
appropriate array of extracurricular options. 101
The Justification for Filing Federally
The justification for filing the case in the federal
courts hinged almost exclusively on the conditions for
readmitting Mississippi to the Union following the Civil
War. According to noted scholar Derek Black, enslaved
African Americans saw education as the most important path
to true freedom. 102 For this reason, preserving the
98

Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Litigation: Legal
Theories, Judicial Activism, and Social Neglect, 20 J. EDUC. FIN. 143
(1994). See also William E. Thro, A New Approach to State
Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525
(1998).
99
Williams, 954 F.3d at 733.
100
Id.
101
Id. The plaintiffs allege that “extracurricular activities are
limited or non-existent.”
102
BLACK, supra note 19, at 79.
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educational rights of all children in Mississippi, as well as
the other southern states, was essential before they were
readmitted to the Union. And, according to the plaintiffs, it
was the federal government’s role to determine which states
were to be readmitted and, ultimately, to ensure that the
southern states continued to meet conditions for
readmission. 103
The Ruling
The Court of Appeals received this case on appeal
from the District Court’s ruling to dismiss the case due to the
Eleventh Amendment, which barred such lawsuits against
states. 104 The appellate court held that “[t]hough we agree
that a portion of the relief plaintiffs seek is prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment, we hold that the lawsuit also partially
seeks relief that satisfies the Ex parte Young exception to
sovereign immunity.” 105 Specifically, the Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiffs’ claim satisfies the Ex parte Young
exception when it seeks to sue state officials in their “official
capacity if the suit seeks prospective relief to redress an
ongoing violation of federal law.” 106 Specifically, the Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ claim that the state’s
current education clause fails to meet the conditions of the
Readmission Act of 1868 “may be pursued under Ex parte
Young.” 107
Gary B. v. Whitmer (2020) 108
103

Williams, 954 F.3d at 732.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 736. “There are three basic elements of an Ex parte
Young lawsuit. The suit must: (1) be brought against state officers who
are acting in their official capacities; (2) seek prospective relief to redress
ongoing conduct; and (3) allege a violation of federal, not state, law.”
107
Id. at 739.
108
Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020).
104
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After years of neglect and poor academic
performance, the plaintiffs in Gary B. filed a lawsuit
claiming that the state of Michigan’s neglect denied students
in the Detroit Public Schools Community District a
minimum educational experience.
The Claim
The plaintiffs in Gary B. are seven students attending
the lowest academically performing schools in the Detroit
Public Schools Community District (Detroit Public
Schools). The defendants are the state of Michigan, Gretchen
Whitmer, in her capacity as governor, and other state
officials who the plaintiffs allege are responsible for the
“abysmal conditions” of the plaintiffs’ schools. 109 The
complaint was originally filed in 2016 and the district court
held that the defendants were the correct responsible parties,
but the lawsuit was dismissed due to failures related to the
equal protection claim, the under developed compulsory
attendance argument, and the fact that education is not a
federal fundamental right. 110
The plaintiffs based their complaint on 42 U.S.C. §
1983 as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and contend that the
state, which assumed control of Detroit Public Schools
multiple times, was responsible for the deplorable academic
environment in the plaintiffs’ schools. 111 Specifically, the
plaintiffs allege their educational experience has been
defined by “the absence of qualified teachers, crumbling
facilities, and insufficient materials.” 112 The lack of qualified
teachers negatively impacted the plaintiffs’ ability to
109

Id. at 620–621. The plaintiffs’ schools are described as
serving “almost exclusively low-income children of color.”
110
Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F.Supp.3d 852, 876 (E.D. Mich.
2018).
111
Gary B., 957 F.3d at 621.
112

Id. at 624.
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become functionally literate and the high teacher turnover
rate magnified the teacher issues. 113 Ultimately, the
plaintiffs’ complaint is that they are forced to “sit in
classrooms where not even the pretense of education takes
place, in schools that are functionally incapable of delivering
access to literacy.” 114
Related to facilities, the plaintiffs entered as evidence
a statement from the City of Detroit, which “admitted that
during the 2015-16 academic year, none of the school
district’s buildings were in compliance with city health and
safety codes.” 115 Facility conditions that made learning
difficult, at best, included extreme temperatures, rodent
feces, the persistent “smell of dead vermin and black mold,”
contaminated water from drinking fountains, and the lack of
basic hygiene products in bathrooms. 116 Finally, the
plaintiffs demonstrated that the schools they attended lacked
sufficient educational materials and that existing materials
were often outdated.
All of these deplorable factors resulted in dismal
academic performance indicators. “Achievement data reveal
that in Plaintiffs’ schools, illiteracy is the norm. The
proficiency rates in Plaintiffs’ schools hover near zero in
nearly all subject areas.” 117 The ruling stresses that in
Michigan education is viewed as a state duty, not a local one.
However, the state’s contributory responsibility in the Gary
B. claim also stems from the fact that “the State has directly
controlled [the Detroit school system] for most of the past
fifteen years through variations of an emergency manager
system.” 118 In addition, in 2016, the state enacted a statute
113

Id. at 624–25.
Id. at 652.
115
Id. at 625–26.
116
Id. at 626.
117
Id. at 627.
114

118

Id. at 622. The state assumed control of Detroit Public
Schools due to consistent poor academic performance and financial
mismanagement.
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that authorized Detroit Public Schools to employ teachers
who did not meet minimum licensure requirements; this law
ensured that the only students in Michigan who could be
taught by teachers who did not meet state requirements for
certification were those attending Detroit Public Schools. 119
The Justification for Filing Federally
The Gary B. complaint was structured around the
Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 to show that the
plaintiffs were being denied access to the “fundamental right
to a basic minimum education.” 120 Related to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
plaintiffs’ case essentially argued that the defendants created
a system of education that discriminated against them when
it came to access to literacy. 121 According to the plaintiffs,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to this case because literacy is “so substantial that no
process is enough to allow the government to restrict” access
to this skill.122
The Ruling
In short, the appellate court held that most of the
plaintiffs’ arguments failed, but ultimately concluded that
these students have been “denied a basic minimum
education, and thus have been deprived of access to
literacy.” 123 This holding is based on the court’s
interpretation of U.S. Supreme Court cases focused on
education, including Brown, Rodriguez, and Plyler. The
court also determined that literacy is a basic “fundamental
119

Id. at 624.
Id. at 643.
121
Id. at 633.
122
Id. at 643.
123
Id. at 621.
120
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right.” 124 Within a month of this ruling, the full Sixth Circuit
vacated the Gary B. holding while also granting an en banc
rehearing of the case. 125 Following this decision, the two
parties in the case settled, which included direct payments to
the plaintiffs and additional revenue to Detroit Public
Schools. 126
Cook v. Raimondo (2020) 127
The focus of the Cook v. Raimondo complaint was that
Rhode Island’s funding for public education denied some
students access to the civics education necessary to create
productive citizens who are capable of voting, serving on
juries, or engaging in other civic activities.
The Claim
The plaintiffs are 13 students attending various
public schools throughout the state of Rhode Island and their
parents. 128 The defendants are four individuals in their
official capacities as public servants as well as the Rhode
Island State Board of Education and the Council on

124

Id. at 649.
Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
126
Governor Whitmer and Plaintiffs Announce Settlement in
Landmark Gary B. Literacy Case, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR GRETCHEN
WHITMER
(May
14,
2020),
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90640529231--,00.html.
127
Complaint, A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F.Supp.3d (D.R.I. 2018).
128
Id. at 6–8.
125
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Elementary and Secondary Education. 129 The complaint was
filed in 2018 and decided in 2020. 130
The plaintiffs allege that the actions of the defendants
violate “their rights because the State of Rhode Island … is
not providing them with an adequate civics education.” 131
The plaintiffs argue that this lack of civics education violates
specific Constitutional provisions, including: the Equal
Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Sixth
Amendment; the Seventh Amendment; and the Republican
Guarantee Clause of Article IV. 132
According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the state of
Rhode Island deemphasized civics instruction over the
emphasis of basic reading and math instruction, which
included overlooking valuable professional development
opportunities for civics teachers. 133 Other factors that also
serve to restrict Rhode Island students from fully
appreciating civic participation are the loss of media
specialists, the inability of some schools to provide students
with civic-focused field trips, and the elimination of
foundational civic opportunities for students such as student
government, debate teams, and school newspapers. 134 The
plaintiffs ask the district court to declare:
[T]hat all students in the United States
have a right under the Fourteenth
129

Id. at 8–10. The individuals mentioned in the lawsuit are:
Gina Raimondo (Governor of the state); Nicholas A. Mattiello (Speaker
of the Rhode Island House of Representatives); Dominick J. Ruggerio
(President of the Rhode Island Senate); and Ken Wagner (Commissioner
of education for the state).
130
A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F.Supp.3d 170 (D.R.I. 2020).
131
Id. at 174.
132
Id.
133
Complaint at 11, A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F.Supp.3d (D.R.I.
2018).
134
Id. at 27–29.
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Amendment, the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments, and Article 4, Section 4 of
the United States Constitution, and under
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 to
a meaningful educational opportunity
adequate to prepare them to be capable
voters and jurors, to exercise effectively
all of their constitutional rights, including
the right to speak freely, to participate
effectively and intelligently in a
democratic political system and to
function productively as civic participants
in a democratic society. 135

The district court’s ruling stated “[t]his is an ambitious
lawsuit. It asks this Court to declare rights that have not been
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, or,
with a single exception, any other federal court in recent
history.” 136
The Justification for Filing Federally
Cook v. Raimondo 137 is the first federal case reviewed to
include in the complaint a section dedicated to addressing
jurisdiction questions. The plaintiffs argue that federal
jurisdiction “is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1341.” 138 In addition, the plaintiffs state their request for
relief is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “which provides
redress for the deprivation under color of state law of rights,
and privileges and immunities secured to all citizens and
person within the jurisdiction of the United States.” 139
135

Id. at 45.
A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F.Supp.3d at 3.
137
Complaint at 6, A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F.Supp.3d (D.R.I.
136

2018).

138
139

Id.
Id.
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Finally, the plaintiffs built their entire case around specific
Constitutional Articles, Amendments, and federal statutes.
The Ruling
The decision, authored by Judge Smith, walks a fine line
between validating the importance of civics education to
ensure a healthy democracy and adhering to legal precedent,
while also acknowledging the Gary B. decision. Ultimately,
the court ruled that legal precedent is clear on the question
of education from a federal perspective, which requires it to
declare that the “[p]laintiffs’ claims must be dismissed.” 140
However, it should be noted that the judge came to this
decision begrudgingly, as evidenced by the following
statement in his ruling:
This case does not represent a wild-eyed
effort to expand the reach of substantive due
process, but rather a cry for help from a
generation of young people who are destined
to inherit a country which we – the
generation currently in charge – are not
stewarding well. What these young people
seem to recognize is that American
democracy is in peril. Its survival, and their
ability to reap the benefits of living in a
country with robust freedoms and rights, a
strong economy, and a moral center
protected by the rule of law is something that
citizens must cherish, protect, and
constantly work for. We would do well to
pay attention to their plea. 141
The defendants filed motions for dismissal stating that the
plaintiffs failed to “join necessary parties … to demonstrate
140
141

A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F.Supp.3d at 5.
Id.
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standing, and the presence of a nonjusticiable political
question.” 142 However, all of these motions were dismissed.
Where the plaintiffs’ case fails, according to Judge Smith, is
in its failure to plead a present injury related to inadequate
civic education. Instead, the plaintiffs’ case is built around
“hypothetical harms.” 143 The ruling ends with this powerful
statement:
Plaintiffs should be commended for
bringing this case. It highlights a deep flaw
in our national education priorities and
policies. The Court cannot provide the
remedy Plaintiffs seek, but in denying
relief, the Court adds its voice to Plaintiffs’
in calling attention to their plea.

Hopefully, other who have the power to
address this need will respond
appropriately. 144

In essence, the ruling acknowledged the validity of
plaintiffs’ claims and calls on the U.S. Supreme Court to
revisit the Rodriguez decision.

PART III: THE NEXT (FEDERAL) WAVE OF SCHOOL
FUNDING LITIGATION?
In comparing early school funding litigation to the
recent five cases, perhaps the most striking difference
between these two groups of caselaw is how much (in the
former cases) or how little (in the latter) funding is
emphasized. We posit that this trend may signal the
142

Id. at 19.
Id. at 24.
144
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
143
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beginning of a new federal “wave” of school funding
litigation.
There exists in the literature a consensus that there
have been three distinct waves of school funding litigation.
First wave cases emphasize equity in school funding in
federal courts, best characterized by San Antonio v.
Rodriguez. Petitioners in this case highlighted disparities in
per-pupil funding rates and/or property tax rates, linking
their arguments to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the U.S. Supreme Court
appeared to be sympathetic to petitioners’ concerns about
educational funding equity in dicta, the High Court stopped
short of holding education to be a fundamental right and
disagreed with petitioners’ assertions that personal or
property wealth-based distinctions should trigger application
of strict scrutiny.
After petitioners’ loss in Rodriguez, school funding
litigants turned their attention to state courts, ushering in
school funding litigation’s second proverbial wave. Equity
arguments in cases during the second wave were similar to
those raised in Rodriguez, however the locus of arguments
was not on the Fourteenth Amendment but instead focused
on state constitutions. Litigation outcomes during the
second wave were mixed from a win-loss perspective,
however what became increasingly apparent was that the
focus on equity was insufficient to address petitioners’
claims.
The prototypical second wave case might look like
this: parents and children from a property-poor school
district realize that per-pupil spending in their schools is far
lower than that in districts with greater property wealth.
Compounding the issue is the fact that these lower per-pupil
rates exist despite the fact that their school district may
actually be taxing itself at significantly higher rates than
their property wealthier neighbors. In some instances, it
might even be statistically or statutorily impossible for
petitioners’ school district to tax themselves at a high enough
rate to even come close to raising the same amount of per-
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pupil spending as the neighboring comparison district.
Concerned about the inequity in per-pupil funding caused by
the way schools are funded in their state, petitioners go to
court. In some instances, petitioners “won” their case, and
the court forced the state legislature’s hand to attempt to
equalize funding between districts. However, what often
resulted – years down the line – was the realization that
equalization of inadequate funding did not result in the
change in educational quality that petitioners had hoped.
Metaphorically speaking, if $10,000 per-pupil
provides a ‘Cadillac-level’ education for a wealthy suburban
student with significant family and community resources,
that same $10,000 spent on a student from a low-income
family living in a historically under-resourced community
might only be enough to purchase a bus pass. The reasons
for these discrepancies are complex and long standing;
intertwined are issues of poverty and systemic racism that
cannot be easily “outspent.” Thus, petitioners soon realized
that “winning,” when it came to equity, was not always
enough to effectuate real change if the socioeconomic deck
had already been stacked against the petitioners’ community.
Thus, the third wave of school funding litigation –
acknowledged by most scholars to begin with Rose v.
Council for Better Education 145 – began; this time with a
focus on adequacy instead of equity. Third wave cases did
not emphasize the amount of money spent on a child’s
education, but instead focused on the outcomes of what
could be purchased. Like cases in the second wave, third
wave cases were filed in state courts and, for the previous
three plus decades, have been filed in 44 different states –
with several states experiencing serial, or ongoing,
litigation.146
145

1989).

Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.

146

Spencer C. Weiler, Jason Kopanke & Christine Kiracofe,
Applying Odds Ratio to the Study of School Finance Litigation, 392 Ed.
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Some scholars have argued that the fourth wave of
school funding litigation has already begun, and that it
involves “pursuing a federal right to an adequate
education” 147 or that the fourth wave may involve “raceconscious” litigation. 148 We agree with these, and other,
scholars that recent school funding litigation appears to be
taking a new turn. To be sure, third wave-type cases
continue to be litigated. 149 However, at the same time, in
recent years a new federal wave of litigation has also been
emerging as well. While the parameters of this new wave of
litigation are not as well defined as earlier waves, they have
several distinct characteristics in common.
Federal Courts Appear Ready to Address School
Funding Litigation
Recent decisions in the cases reviewed suggest that
federal courts may be increasingly receptive to entertain
federal school funding arguments. For example, petitioners
have successfully overcome the long-standing argument that
federal claims related to funding litigation were barred by
the 11th Amendment. For example, both the Martinez and
Williams courts found an exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity as held in Ex parte Young. 150

Law Rep. 1 (2021). The 44 states exclude the five states to never have
an adjudicated school funding lawsuit (Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada,
and Utah) as well as Georgia, which has not had a funding case
adjudicated after 1989.
147
Gillespie, supra note 52, at 989.
148
David G. Hinojosa, “Race-Conscious” School Finance
Litigation: Is a Fourth Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869
(2016).
149
According to Spencer C. Weiler and Scott Bauries, Special
Education’s Lessons for Educational Reform Litigation, 6 ED. L. & POL.
REV. 127, 149 (2021), “the ‘waves’ metaphor is not meant to place clear
dividing lines between the three classifications of litigation over time and
that the use of ‘waves’ has been criticized for being unnecessarily
reductive.”
150
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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The Quest for the “Fundamental” Right Continues, but
Differently
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in San
Antonio v. Rodriguez dashed petitioners’ hopes of the High
Court adding education to its list of fundamental rights in the
United States. However, this decision has not dampened
school funding advocates’ hopes that one day education will
be recognized as a fundamental right. In a recent article,
Martha McCarthy notes that given the flurry of new federal
litigation “the Supreme Court conceivably will take a stand
that education is an implied fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution, thus overturning the Rodriguez precedent”
adding that “perhaps . . . the time IS right for a Supreme
Court declaration of a right to the resources needed for all
our citizens to become literate.” 151
McCarthy’s comments underscore the likely nature
of the new wave of litigation aimed at securing a
fundamental right; it may not be education that is a
fundamental right, but instead literacy or civic knowledge or
some other element of education raised in this new wave of
cases.
Litigants in this new wave of cases have
demonstrated that there may be a path to success in
specifically highlighting what deprivation of an adequate
education entails: loss of jurors able to participate in the
democratic process, or loss of fully literate citizens able to
fully engage in society. By linking the fundamental right
argument to outcomes instead of inputs, litigants may
ultimately be more successful at the federal level.

151

Martha McCarthy, Is there a Federal Right to a Minimum
Education?, 2020 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 28 (2020).
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PART IV: THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME
COURT AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE
SCHOOL FUNDING LITIGATION
The adage “timing is everything” appropriately
applies to the speculation on how the Supreme Court might
handle future school funding litigation filed within the
federal court system. When – and by whom – a case is heard
can be as important to a decision’s outcome as is the content
of the case itself. There is no question that Supreme Court
Justices’ opinions are impacted, at least in part, by their
ideological leanings. Researchers Andrew Martin and Kevin
Quinn developed a metric (resulting in “Martin-Quinn”
scores) that measures the judicial ideology of a given Justice
on a continuum where “0” is neutral and increasing positive
scores indicate increasing levels of conservative ideology,
and increasingly negative scores indicate increasing levels
of liberal ideology. 152 For example, a Justice who had a
Martin-Quinn score of 4 would be much more conservative
than one with a score of -3.
In 1973, when Rodriguez was decided, the Justices
in the majority, issuing the holding that education was not a
fundamental right, all had positive Martin-Quinn scores,
suggesting a conservative ideological bent. As seen in the
table below, their Martin-Quinn scores ranged from a high
of 4.266 (Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court Jurist with
the highest Martin-Quinn score for 1973) to a low of 0.489
(Justice Stewart). In comparison, all of the Justices in the
minority (with the exception of one) had negative MartinQuinn scores, ranging from 0.563 (Justice White, the only
Justice in the minority with a positive Martin-Quinn score
for 1973) to ---7.821 (Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court
jurist with the lowest Martin-Quinn score for 1973).
Analyzing the ideological bent of Justices that took part in
152

Andrew Martin & Kevin Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores,
FOR
EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH
IN
THE
LAW,
CENTER
https://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu/index.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
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Rodriguez suggests that this case was decided by a
conservative-leaning Court.
Table 1: Martin-Quinn Score for Supreme Court
Justices in Rodriguez
Justice

Martin-Quinn Score
(1973)

Justice Burger (majority)

2.212

Justice Stewart (majority)

0.489

Justice Blackmun
(majority)
Justice Powell (majority)

1.301

Justice Rehnquist
(majority)
Justice Douglas (minority)

4.266
-7.821

Justice Brennan (minority)

-1.733

Justice White (minority)

0.563

Justice Marshall (minority)

-1.475

1.160

Now, nearly 50 years after the decision in Rodriguez,
the makeup of the Supreme Court has changed dramatically.
There has been a significant turn-over in the Court’s
membership in recent years, with former President Trump
nominating three Justices to the Supreme Court. Current
Martin-Quinn scores are available through 2019, the most
recent year for which data are published, and the MartinQuinn scores for the current Justices are reported in Table
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2. 153 However, this means that data are not included for the
most recent Justice to join the Court, Justice Amy Coney
Barrett. However, it is safe to assume, based on recent
decisions, that Justice Coney Barrett is likely to have a
positive Martin-Quinn score.
Table 2: Martin-Quinn Scores for Current Supreme
Court Justices
Justice

Martin-Quinn Score
(2019)

Justice Roberts

0.216

Justice Thomas

3.691

Justice Breyer

-1.867

Justice Alito

2.051

Justice Sotomayor

-3.483

Justice Kagan

-1.693

Justice Gorsuch

0.836

Justice Kavanaugh

0.513

Justice Coney Barrett

No data available

Based solely on the Martin-Quinn ideological scale, it
appears that the current Court is at least as conservative
ideologically – if not more so – than its counterpart in 1973.
Thus, assuming that decision-making related to education as
153

Id.

228
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2022/iss1/5

40

Kiracofe and Weiler: Surfing the Waves

2]

Surfing the Waves

a fundamental right is swayed by political ideology, perhaps
the wave of recent federal cases has come – at least from
petitioners’ point of view – at an inopportune time given the
current membership of the Court. Or perhaps not.
Ultimately, we do not know, and, at the same time, we must
acknowledge that the Court’s composition could change by
the time the case is actually argued before the Justices.
CONCLUSION
As we reviewed at the beginning of this work, initial school
funding lawsuits were filed in federal courts. However, due
the outcomes of these two cases, 154 the Serrano rulings, and
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez, school
finance litigation has shifted almost exclusively to the state
court arena since the 1970s. In addition, the focus of all
school funding claims has been on the inequitable and
inadequate levels of funding within a state’s funding formula
for public education. The focus of this work has been to
highlight recent and emerging trends in school funding
lawsuits.
The five cases highlighted in this work illustrate a potential
shift in school funding claims, which could constitute the
long-anticipated fourth wave of school finance litigation.
Specifically, we observe the following shifts. First, these
cases are being filed in federal courts. Second, the plaintiffs’
claims focus on specific aspects of education that are being
denied to them under the state’s current funding formula.
Finally, the plaintiffs are grounding their claims in specific
aspects of the U.S. Constitution to support their claims.
There is reason for optimism when analyzing this
shift in school funding claims. Of the five cases reviewed,
the plaintiffs only prevailed in two rulings and one of the two
was quickly vacated. 155 Although a small sample size, these
data align with the typical percentage of plaintiff victories in
154

The plaintiffs lost in both the McInnis and Burress cases.
The plaintiffs prevailed in Williams v. Reeves and Gary B.
The Gary B. ruling was vacated.
155
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the second and third waves. However, another reason for
optimism is perhaps found in the decisions that sided with
the defendants. In all three holdings, there is evidence that
the courts found the plaintiffs’ claims compelling and
justiciable. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs’ cases failed on
specific legal elements that the judges could not overlook. 156
We believe we are on the precipice of a new wave in school
funding claims. What may follow in the future will be more
cases filed in federal courts contending a state’s funding
formula is denying a specific group of students access to an
adequate and equitable education. 157 Ultimately, if this trend
is followed to its logical conclusion, at some point the U.S.
Supreme Court will be invited, or forced, to revisit its
Rodriguez ruling. It stands to reason that this fourth wave of
school funding claims holds the potential to ensure that all
students, regardless of zip code, ethnicity, gender, or any
other arbitrary or capricious distinguishing factor, is
provided access to an equitable and adequate education.

156

The only case where the judges may have actually
overlooked precedent and case law was the Gary B. ruling.
157
The focus of future school funding lawsuits could be
individual claims. See Scott R. Bauries, A Common-law
Constitutionalism for The Right to Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949
(2014).
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